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ABSTRACT 
There are a number of recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to the ethical 
analysis of technology. These works, however, have not attended sufficiently to one 
central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to Confucian ethics, 
and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is what 
distinguishes it from other ethical traditions. Any discussion of Confucian ethics for 
technology, therefore, remains incomplete without accounting for Li. This chapter 
aims to elaborate on the concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance to ethics 
of technology. Particularly, by referring to Li’s communicative, formative, and 
aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of technology with an 
emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and demonstrate how this 
approach proceeds with the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I attempt to 
answer the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of technology. 
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Why Confucianism Matters in Ethics of Technology 
The idea that Confucianism matters to ethics of technology may seem peculiar, as it has long 
subordinated the interest in science and technology to the pursuit of ethical perfection, and 
thus undervalued the role of science and technology. However, with the contemporary New 
Confucianism (re-)affirming the importance of democracy, science, and technology, 
alongside Confucianism, for the future of Chinese culture in the mid-twentieth century, they 
have not only defended the compatibility of Confucianism and modern science and 
technology, but also argued for the possible contribution of Confucian values for a more 
humane development in science and technology (He 2018). Hence, the idea that 
Confucianism does matter to ethics of technology should not be too surprising.  
Indeed, there are recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to ethical analysis of 
technology (see, e.g. Wong 2012; Vallor 2016). These works, however, have not attended 
sufficiently to one central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to 
Confucian ethics, and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is 
what distinguishes it from other ethical traditions (see, e.g. Fan 2010; Bockover 2012; 
Stalnaker 2016; Olberding 2015, 2016). Accordingly, any discussion of Confucian ethics for 
technology remains incomplete without accounting for Li. The aim of this chapter, therefore, 
is to elaborate on the concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance for ethical reflection 
of technology. 
I begin with Joel Kupperman’s critique of mainstream analytic ethical theories as being 
irrelevant and incomplete, and then suggest that his critique also applies to the existing 
discussions in ethics of technology. Kupperman’s critique usefully reminds us of the ethical 
importance of styles of interaction and, relatedly, the role of Confucian Li in informing and 
guiding the styles, which have so far escaped the attention of philosophers and ethicists of 
technology. Hence, I shall elaborate on the idea of Confucian Li and examine its role in 
ethical reflection. After illustrating the idea of Confucian Li, I shall discuss different ways in 
which it is relevant to the ethical analysis of technology. Particularly, by analyzing Li’s 
communicative, formative, and aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of 
technology with an emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and 
demonstrate how, based on Confucian Li, a Confucian ethics of technology may work. In 
doing so, I hope to have answered the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of 
technology. 
Big Moment Ethics, Ethics of Technology, and the Ethical Importance of 
Style 
Joel Kupperman (2002, 2007, 2010) argues for the importance of Confucian ethics by noting 
a significant gap in mainstream analytic ethical theories. He characterizes mainstream 
ethical theories as “big moment ethics” that centers on high stake ethical decisions for 
infrequent, one-off situations, which are often presented in a decontextualized manner. An 
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obvious example is the trolley problem, where we are asked to decide whether one should 
sacrifice one life to save five, but have been provided artificial and/or minimal details of the 
scenario.1 Kupperman (2007) argues that the “big moment ethics” is unsatisfactory, as the 
ethical judgments derived from the decontextualized cases often do not generalized once 
contextual details are supplied. “Big moment ethics”, therefore, is unhelpful in guiding our 
judgments and behaviors in the contextualized and richly textured ordinary life. More 
importantly, Kupperman points out that, by focusing on the infrequent, one-off situations, 
the “big moment ethics” has truncated ethical reflection and left out most of our everyday 
life from it as “ethical free-play zone, in which one can do whatever one likes [and] yields an 
ethics that does not make demands at all often [nor] continuously” (Kupperman 2002, 40). It 
thus omits ethically significant issues in everyday life that demand a sustained effort, such as 
a person’s style of life, personal relationships, and self-improvement. In short, Kupperman 
criticizes mainstream ethical theories as irrelevant and incomplete, that is—the 
decontextualized examples discussed in mainstream ethical theories offer little guidance for 
ordinary situations, and they also neglect meaningful ethical questions in everyday life that 
require on-going reflection by focusing on the rare, one-off cases. 
In ethics of technology, while there are discussions focusing on rare, one-off scenarios, 
e.g. existential risks (Bostrom 2002) or debates highly speculative in nature (cf. Nordmann 
2007; Nordmann & Rip 2009) that are susceptible to Kupperman’s critique, the field has 
undergone a number of ‘turns’ that seems to have addressed Kupperman’s charge to the 
mainstream ethical thought. For example, since ‘the empirical turn’, philosophers and 
ethicists of technology have paid close attention to how technologies are actually created, 
how they actually work, and how they in reality co-shape the self and society with their 
designers, users, and other related parties (Kroes & Meijers 2000; Brey 2010). Also, ‘the 
design turn’ (van den Hoven 2008) and ‘the axiological turn’ (Kroes & Meijers 2016) have 
invited philosophers and ethicists to explicate values in technology and proactively embeds 
them into technologies to make technologies conducive to human well-being and to a good 
society. So construed, current discussions in the ethics of technology do attend to the 
specifics of technology and everyday life and allow a much broader scope of ethical 
reflection than the “big moment ethics”.   
For instance, postphenomenology, i.e. one of the most elaborated approaches in 
philosophy and ethics of technology since the empirical turn (see, e.g. Ihde 1990; Verbeek 
2005; Rosenberger & Verbeek 2015), can be viewed as an answer to Kupperman’s critique. 
Postphenomenology examines and evaluates how technologies mediate the relations 
between human beings and the world, and it discusses ways to improve individual and 
societal well-being through different forms of technological mediation via the design and 
(everyday) use of technology. In effect, Peter-Paul Verbeek’s postphenomenological 
 
1 The trolley problem has generated an enormous scholarly discussion, and it is not my intention to 
discuss it (and other similar ethical dilemmas) in this chapter. The intention is to point out, as 
Kupperman also does, that mainstream analytic ethical theories often refer to decontextualized cases 
that are highly unlikely to be encountered by people in their everyday life. For a recent overview of 
the trolley problem, see, e.g. Kamm (2015). 
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approach proposes deliberately using and designing technologies to shape human 
subjectivity and establish oneself as an ethical subject, which is taken to be a continuous 
(self-)practice (Verbeek 2011). To ethics of technology—at least, to those approaches that 
take seriously the various ‘turns’ in philosophy of technology—Kupperman’s critique does 
not seem applicable anymore.  
Yet, Ike Kamphof (2017) recently argues that the postphenomenological approaches 
have overemphasized the role and power of individuals in shaping human subjectivity 
through the use and design of technologies, and those approaches have underplayed the 
significance of relations between individuals in incorporating (new) technologies into 
practices. She argues that the need to maintain good relations with the others, i.e. in 
Kamphof’s case, the good relation between caregivers and elderly clients, should inform 
how technologies are to be used, and it could be achieved only by carefully balancing users’ 
feeling, the feeling of others in the relation, and the environment where the technologies 
are being used. Here, Kamphof’s argument usefully draws our attention to the fact that a 
proper use (and design) of technology does not merely amount to the shaping of oneself or 
establishing oneself as an ethical subject, but it must include the thoughts and feelings at the 
recipient end, and thus it is inevitably relational.2 
Although Kamphof has not explicitly formulated her argument in terms of styles of 
interaction, she rightly emphasizes that good relations between individuals, e.g. the 
caregivers and the elderly clients, are maintained as much by using (or non-using) 
technology for suitable ends as by an appropriate style of interaction with others through 
technology. By emphasizing the self and subjectivity, it is this style of interaction with others 
through technology that postphenomenological approaches have not sufficiently accounted 
for.3 In this respect, Kupperman’s critique remains applicable to ethics of technology to the 
extent that the existing approaches fail to sufficiently integrate people’s style of interaction, 
personal relationships, and self-improvement in the ethical reflection of technology.4 
 
2 Unless, of course, the consequences arising from the use (and design) of technology is entirely 
personal. Yet, even then it is questionable whether the person who uses this ‘purely’ personal 
technology can avoid the consideration of others, as his interaction with others may have been 
altered by the ‘purely’ personal technology. 
3 For a defense of the postphenomenological approach from Kamphof’s critique, see Sharon (2017). It 
is useful to point out that Sharon does not reject Kamphof’s focus on personal relations, but argues 
that it offers a supplement but not an alternative to the postphenomenological approach. In this 
sense, Sharon too acknowledges an emphasis on the role and power of individuals in existing 
postphenomenological approaches. 
4 Here, one may argue that the approaches to ethics of technology inspired by Aristotelian virtue 
ethics do include personal relationships in their ethical reflection, e.g. Vallor (2016); and, thus even if 
Kupperman’s critique applies to postphenomenological approaches, it does not apply to them. 
Kupperman’s response to this objection comes in two parts: firstly, he notes that Aristotelian virtue 
ethics has, in fact, paid little attention to the style of interaction, understood as the expressions of 
attitudes and behaviors for specific scenarios (Kupperman 2002); and, secondly, Kupperman (2004) 
argues that Aristotelian virtue ethics views ethical decisions as a one-person game but not a 
communal, multi-person game, and thus does not sufficiently capture the relational nature of ethical 
decisions. 
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If Kupperman’s critique remains relevant, his insights on the contribution of Confucian 
ethics to mainstream ethical thought should also be relevant to the ethical reflection of 
technology. Before elaborating Kupperman’s view in detail, however, it is helpful to explain 
why Confucian ethics is particularly helpful in foregrounding or capturing the relational 
dimension of ethics and the on-going nature of ethical reflection which Kupperman deems 
essential to ethical reflection.  
From the Confucian perspective, the notion of personhood is characterized as relational 
and developmental (Yu & Fan 2007; Wong 2012).5 The Confucian notion of person is 
relational, as Confucians believe that human beings are born into a web of familial and social 
relationships and that they can only mature and flourish within such a web of relationships 
by fulfilling the role obligations prescribed by their roles and relationships. Roles and 
relationships, therefore, are necessarily foregrounded in Confucian ethics as they are its 
normative foundation. Also, the Confucian notion of person is developmental, as Confucians 
understand personhood to be neither static, i.e. a person is not to be identified by any sets 
of characteristics, nor given, i.e. human beings are not born as persons, but they learn and 
practice in everyday life to become persons. Hence, Confucian ethical cultivation is 
necessarily an on-going process that covers every aspect of one’s life. Here, philosophers 
and ethicists of technology can already learn from the Confucian notion of personhood by 
recognizing the place of personal roles and relationships in the making of ethical judgments 
and by reconsidering the significance of the mundane in ethical life (Wong 2012). 
Kupperman introduces ‘naturalness’ (or, ‘harmony’) as another normative concept that 
the mainstream ethical thought can learn from Confucian ethics. By ‘naturalness’, 
Kupperman refers to the idea that “the agent is reasonably comfortable with her or his 
behavior, and there is no conflict between the behavior and what the agent normally is like” 
(Kupperman 2002, 44). He illustrates the idea of naturalness (of behaviors) with the 
expression of gratitude: many of us can say ‘thank you’ at ease in return for a favor done, 
but children may have difficulties in their expression of gratitude, i.e. children may forget to 
do so as they get overwhelmed by the favor, they may be confused and hesitate to say 
‘thank you’, or they may simply be rude and thus have to be reminded. In the case of 
children who are not at ease and fluent in expressing gratitude, even if they do say ‘thank 
you’, their behaviors are not natural (or harmonized), and the unnaturalness of behaviors 
demonstrates something amiss ethically. As Kupperman argues, people’s style, i.e. how 
something is done and said, presents and reveals their attitudes and who they are, which, in 
turn, is essential in building and maintaining personal relationships (Kupperman 2002, 2007). 
So, the children who reluctantly say ‘thank you’ may have said ‘thank you’, but their style of 
interaction has failed to convey thankfulness or show themselves to others that they are a 
gratuitous person. Interestingly, the ethical imports of styles of interaction have also been 
asserted by enactivist philosophers and cognitive scientists, who point out that “different 
styles of interaction, with their varying affective overtones, will make an ethical difference, 
 
5 The Confucian notion of personhood is also characterized as virtue-based. For a detail discussion of 
the Confucian notion of personhood and its implication to ethics of technology, see Wong (2012). 
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in the sense that they will modulate the ethical colouring of any given situation to which the 
categories of ethical description or appraisal may apply” (Colombetti & Torrance 2009, 520; 
also, see Hutton 2006). 
The Confucian ideal of naturalness, therefore, compels us to consider the ethical imports 
of not only what we should do and say, but also how we should do and say them—or, as 
Kongzi remarks on filial piety in The Analects 2.7 and 2.8, 
The Master said, “Nowadays ‘filial’ means simply being able to provide one’s parents 
with nourishment. But even dogs and horses are provided with nourishment. If you 
are not respectful, wherein lies the difference?” (Slingerland 2003, 10). 
The Master said, “It is the demeanor [of filial piety] that is difficult. If there is work to 
be done, disciples shoulder the burden, and when wine and food are served, elders 
are given precedence, but surely filial piety consists of more than this” (Slingerland 
2003, 10). 
It is important to act and speak with an appropriate attitude—even when what we do and 
say are already the morally right things to do and say, e.g. providing for parents, shouldering 
teacher’s burden of work, or giving elders precedence, as our attitudes and our self are 
expressed and revealed by how we do and say the right things. 
In short, Confucian ethics recommends a close look at people’s style of interaction for it 
communicates people’s attitudes (about others) and shows themselves to others, which are 
essential in ethically fruitful connections with others.6 But what does the shift to the style of 
interaction as recommended by Confucian ethics mean to the ethical reflection of 
technology? Or, simply, from the Confucian perspective, how styles of interaction can be 
introduced to ethics of technology? To answer these questions, it is essential to first discuss 
what guides people’s style of interaction. For Confucians, the answer is ritual (‘Li’): it is Li 
that informs what and how people should do and say in different personal and social 
circumstances. 
A Primer on Confucian Ritual (‘Li’)  
The Analects 12.1 writes, “[r]estraining yourself and returning to the rites [‘Li’] constitutes 
Goodness [‘Ren’]” (Slingerland 2003, 125); Confucian Li, often translated as ‘ritual’, ‘rites’ or 
‘etiquette’, assumes an essential role in Confucian ethics as a normative standard for 
judgment and behavior, and it also informs and guides people’s style of interaction.7 
 
6 I believe the aim of Kupperman’s critique is to foreground the ‘hows’, which have mostly been 
ignored in analytic ethical theories. So, it is important to note that his critique does not entail that a 
rejection of the ‘whats’ in ethical reflection. 
7 The normative priority of Li in relation to Ren, often translated as ‘humanity’, ‘goodness’, 
‘benevolence’, remains a subject of intense discussion. See, e.g. Li (2007). I shall not settle the priority 
between Li and Ren in this chapter, as an answer to this question has little implication to the current 
discussion.  
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In Confucian philosophy8, Li refers to both ceremonial and formal rituals, e.g. sacrificial 
offerings, burial ceremonies, and mourning practices, and behavioral patterns for everyday 
encounters. Accordingly, Confucian Li is not a set of abstract normative principles, but a 
collection of substantive normative instructions that informs and guides people’s judgment 
and behavior. Some examples from The Analects should be illustrative of the substantive 
requirements it prescribes, 
“When called on by his lord to receive a guest, his countenance would become alert 
and serious, and he would hasten his steps. When he saluted those in attendance 
beside him—extending his clasped hands to the left or right, as their position 
required—his robes remained perfectly arrayed, both front and back. Hastening 
forward, he moved smoothly, as though gliding upon wings. Once the guest had left, 
he would always return to report, “The guest is no longer looking back.”” (The 
Analects 10.3, in Slingerlands 2003, 99) 
“The gentleman did not use reddish-black or maroon for the trim of his garment, nor 
did he use red or purple for his informal dress. In the summer, he wore a single layer 
of linen or hemp but always put on an outer garment before going out. With a black 
upper garment he would wear a lambskin robe; with a white upper garment he 
would wear a fawn-skin robe; and with a yellow upper garment he would wear a 
fox-fur robe. His informal fur robe was long, but the right sleeve was short. He 
required that his nightgown be knee-length. He wore thick fox and badger furs when 
at home. Except when he was in mourning, he never went anywhere without having 
all of his sash ornaments properly displayed. With the exception of his one-piece 
ceremonial skirts, his lower garments were always cut and hemmed. He did not 
wear [black] lambskin robes or dark caps on condolence visits. On the day of the 
“Auspicious Moon,” he would always put on his [black] court attire and present 
himself at court.” (The Analects 10.6, in Slingerlands 2003, 100-102) 
“He [i.e. Kongzi] would not sit unless his mat was straight (‘Zheng’)” (The Analects 
10.12, in Slingerlands 2003, 105) 
 
As these examples in The Analects demonstrate, Confucian Li ranges from the norms for 
formal occasions, e.g. receiving guests, to the patterns of behaviors in everyday life, e.g. a 
person’s clothing and posture, and it prescribes appropriate responses and behaviors to 
people, with reference to their role(s) and relations with others, in specific social 
circumstances. It is useful to emphasize that the instructions, which involve Kongzi as an 
exemplar, do not only advise what is to be done and said but document in minute detail how 
they are to be completed. It is also important to note that, while the instructions in 
 
8 My discussion of Li refers primarily to The Analects and Xunzi, which are considered to be the key 
texts for understanding the idea of Li in (early-)Confucianism (Radice 2017). I should already point out 
that this section is not intended to be an exegesis or critical (historical-)textual study of the two texts, 
the modest aim of this section is to introduce a ‘workable’ idea of Li that can enrich the ethical 
analysis of technology. 
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Confucian Li appear to be extremely rigid, Confucian ethics does have room for (reflective) 
disregards and exceptions to it (Li 2007; Kim 2009, 2010). Indeed, since Confucian Li depends 
on people’s role(s) and their relations with the interacting partners as well as the social 
circumstances where the interaction occurs, which are contextual and fine-grainedly 
textured, personalization and improvisation of Li will be required for any successful 
performance (Ames 2002). 
In the discussion of the ethical importance of Confucian Li, three lines of argument can 
be discerned. The first line of argument focuses on the communicative function of Li. For 
instance, Chenyang Li (2007) conceptualizes Li as “cultural grammar” for personal and social 
interaction within a community. He points out that, like linguistic communication, which is 
based on languages and their grammatical rules, personal and social interaction takes place 
against the background of values and is governed by norms of interaction. In other words, Li 
serves as a public, shared and comprehensible medium to interpret people’s responses and 
behaviors at various social circumstances. Moreover, since Li is passed down from 
generation to generation, it embodies the values of the tradition and provides a normative 
standard in accordance with that tradition. Successful performance of Li, therefore, 
expresses the values of a community and its tradition, and those who belong to that 
community, or who are familiar with that tradition, can grasp the meaning (and values) of 
the performed Li. It is in this sense, Mary Bockover (2012) argues that Confucian Li can be 
viewed as a cultural-specific “body language”. 
The ethical dimension of Confucian Li’s communicative function is best described in Kelly 
Epley’s argument for the role of Li in caring (Epley 2015). She rightly points out that 
expressions of need and care are not isolated from social conventions and communal 
standards of manners. In effect, social conventions and manners play a constitutive role in 
comprehending needs and realizing care. Imagine a person who fails to attend to another 
person’s need because their expressions of need are different, e.g. a community where 
requests for help must be explicitly stated (Community A) versus one that does not require 
or discourage explicit requests for help (Community B). The person from Community A may 
fail to offer help to the person from Community B even when the latter clearly requires help 
but does not request for it explicitly, and it is the result of their different expressions of need. 
Relatedly, a person, who are provided care by other people, may not be sufficiently 
cared for when there is a mismatch of the expressions of care. It could be so when the 
person does not recognize the care provided by others as caring because care is expressed 
differently in his community. In short, Li is of ethical import as a shared resource for 
understanding and interpreting need and care—or, for that matter, other important shared 
values as well; and, it creates a community of care where the members can recognize the 
need of each other and respond appropriately.9 As Ana S. Iltis has argued, rituals create and 
shape the social reality of ritual participants and observers by establishing and reinforcing 
their expectations, relationships, and roles (2012, 21-23). Hence, knowing rituals means that 
 
9 For a discussion on the community-forming and communal bonding potential of Confucian Li, see 
Bockover (2012). 
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knowing what to expect from others and what others expect from one, and it also means 
that knowing how one is related to others and what role obligations one has. A failed ritual 
performance, therefore, can be seen at once as a communication, social, and ethical failure. 
Here, it is important to reiterate that Li—or, social conventions and manners—does not only 
prescribe what a person should do and say, but also how it should be done and said, and 
that both what and how things are done and said are essential in understanding and 
interpretation of people’s responses and behaviors.10 
The second line of argument for Confucian Li is based on its formative function, namely 
practice and performance of Li is essential to individual and societal flourishing. Here, 
Xunzi’s description of the formative function of Li is instructive, 
“Ritual [‘Li’] cuts off what is too long and extends what is too short. It subtracts from 
what is excessive and adds to what is insufficient. It achieves proper form for love 
and respect, and it brings to perfection the beauty of carrying out yi [‘righteousness’] 
(Hutton 2014, 209). 
Being concerned with human being’s natural inclination towards selfishness, Xunzi argues 
that Li is essential to tame our (excessive) desires and heighten our (deficient) ethical 
feelings by prescribing appropriate emotional responses and behaviors for various 
circumstances; and, it is through practicing and performing Li, people become accustomed 
to the right emotional responses and behaviors, and thereby transforming their dispositions 
(Sung 2012; Olberding 2015, 2016; Stalnaker 2016).11  
The importance of the bodily-performative dimension of Li deserves to be reemphasized. 
As bodily practice and performance, Confucian Li must describe how it is to be executed to 
avoid being vacuous.12 Moreover, the bodily-performative dimension of Confucian Li allows 
people to internalize norms and values and enables them to react ethically to different 
situations in spontaneity, which is crucial to individual ethical life because many of our 
everyday ethical judgment and behavior are pre-reflective and influenced by the situations 
(Olberding 2016; also, see Hutton 2006; Slingerland 2011; Seok 2012). Alternatively, it has 
also been suggested that the practice and performance of Confucian Li creates an “as if” 
space, in which people’s dispositions are trained and refined (Puett 2015). According to this 
understanding of Li, the bodily-performative dimension is also essential because it is through 
the (re-)enactment of critical events in the “as if” space, individuals acquire the emotional 
and physiological experience and learn to modulate them. The (re-)enactment, therefore, 
has to include minute details of the critical events in order to fulfill the purpose of training 
and refinement. 
 
10 Both Buss and Calhoun offer a similar argument for the ethical importance of manners in terms of 
their expressive function, see Buss (1999) and Calhoun (2000). 
11 Olberding’s discussion of Xunzi’s defense of ritual mourning against Zhuangzi’s critique offers an 
instructive example for the working of Confucian Li, see Olberding (2015). 
12 Here, a comparison with the acquisition of (bodily) skills should be useful. For example, consider 
learning how to play tennis. It is not sufficient to learn the rules of the game and the techniques and 
strategies available, one must also learn how to executive those techniques and strategies. Moreover, 
tennis players improve their game by honing and refining the ways they play, i.e. their gesture, 
strokes, etc. Also, see Stalnaker (2016) for his comparison of ritual with music and cooking. 
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Finally, there is also an aesthetic dimension in Confucian Li as illustrated in The Analects 
(e.g. 10.6) and in Xunzi, e.g. 
“If your exertions of blood, qi, intention, and thought accord with ritual, they will be 
ordered and effective. If they do not accord with ritual, they will be disorderly and 
unproductive. If your meals, clothing, dwelling, and activities accord with ritual, they 
will be congenial and well-regulated. If they do not accord with ritual, you will 
encounter dangers and illnesses. If your countenance, bearing, movements, and 
stride accord with ritual, they will be graceful. If they do not accord with ritual, they 
will be barbaric, obtuse, perverse, vulgar, and unruly.” (Hutton 2014, 10) 
When one acts and speaks with Confucian Li, i.e. the person acts and speaks with 
appropriate styles, her behaviors will be “congenial and well-regulated” and “graceful”—or, 
more generally, beautiful. Olberding (2015, 2016) explains the ethical and social implications 
of the beautification function of Confucian Li by drawing attention to the power of positive 
aesthetic properties to mitigate pre-reflective, negative impressions arise from ‘ugliness’ (or, 
incivility) of behaviors and social environments. By conforming to Confucian Li, i.e. a 
communal standard of appropriate emotional responses and behaviors, one beautifies her 
emotional response and behaviors by making them more pleasant and agreeable, thereby 
reducing the potential for conflict and encouraging social cooperation.13 Or, as Yuriko Saito 
astutely notes, “[t]he aesthetic appeal of an elegant body movement thus is not for the sake 
of aesthetic effect alone but more importantly a sensuous display of one’s other-regarding 
considerations” (Saito 2017, 211). 
To summarize, the aim of this section is to introduce a practicable idea of Confucian Li 
and illustrate its relation to styles of interaction. Briefly, Confucian Li prescribes what a 
person should do and say, and how they should do and say them in accordance with their 
role(s) and relation(s) with the interacting partners and with the circumstance she finds 
herself in. To Confucian ethics, Li and the style of interaction prescribed by it are essential 
because they enable individuals in the community, or those who share a tradition, 
communicate meaning and values appropriately. At the same time, the practice and 
performance of Confucian Li, understood as a bodily activity, allow individuals to refine and 
modulate their (pre-reflective) sensibilities of others and the environment. Finally, Confucian 
Li also accounts for the power of the aesthetic properties in ethical and social realms and 
includes an aesthetic dimension. 
From Ritual (‘Li’) and Technology to Ritualizing Technology 
Referring to Confucian Li, we can now rethink ethical reflection of technology. In this section, 
I shall describe what the communicative, formative, and aesthetic functions of Confucian Li 
emphasize in the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I articulate what Confucian 
ethics can contribute to ethics of technology, namely a different approach to the ethical 
 
13 Also, see Kim (2012) for an exposition of Xunzi’s view on the function of Li in relation to the 
acquisition of civic virtues. 
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analysis of technology focusing on community, performance, and the aesthetic of 
technology. 
The communicative function of Li reminds us of Li, i.e. the prescribed styles of 
interaction, social conventions, and manners, is a shared medium of meaning and values 
within a community, and thus requires us to consider how, and if, meaning and values are 
expressed and revealed through a particular style of interaction at a specific social 
circumstance. For ethical analysis of technology, this shift to Li necessitates an examination 
not only of what values are embedded in technology, but how these values are, or can be, 
manifested through the use of technology and in technologically-mediated interactions. At 
the same time, this shift to Li also implies that we need to consider (i) the recipients, who 
comprehend and interpret the values expressed and revealed by the use of technology and 
in technologically-mediated interactions, and (ii) the existing styles of interaction, social 
conventions, and manners in a community, which provide the common ground of 
understanding and interpretation of need and care as well as other important shared values. 
Accordingly, a Confucian ethical analysis of technology has to be both (i) relational and (ii) 
communal. 
Here, Kamphof’s discussion of how caregivers adopt tele-monitoring system is 
instructive (Kamphof 2017). She documents how caregivers use motion sensors in different 
ways that re-articulate the meanings of privacy for and with the elderly clients; and, in doing 
so, the caregivers could respect their privacy while using the tele-monitoring system. 
Kamphof notices that the caregivers’ concern is not only about the value—or, the lack 
thereof—in the system per se but also about how the value of privacy and a good caregiver-
patient relation are, or can be, realized in use with the elderly clients. Kamphof’s discussion 
is illustrative of the importance of both the ‘hows’ and the relational dimension in the 
ethical analysis of technology.  
From a Confucian perspective, however, what Kamphof’s analysis has still missed is the 
communal dimension for understanding and interpreting the caregivers’ use of the system. 
More specifically, how—or, through which styles of interaction—care is expressed and 
revealed in that community, how does the introduction of tele-monitoring system enhance 
or interfere with the caregivers’ original style of interaction, and whether the elderly clients 
understand the altered style of interaction as care and why. Of course, if a good caregiver-
patient relation has been maintained after the introduction of the tele-monitoring system, 
the elderly clients certainly see the new style of interaction, as it has been altered by the 
technology, as care. However, the major insight from the above discussion of Confucian Li is 
that philosophers, ethicists, and technology designers are still in need of a normative 
standard to think through whether, and to what extent, the different styles of interaction 
introduced by specific technologies are appropriate or not; and, the Confucian ethics of 
technology answer these questions with reference to Li. 
What is also missed is the opportunity to use Li, i.e. the shared medium of meaning and 
values, to improve technology use and technologically-mediated interaction by reproducing 
or extending the already appropriate style of interaction in the design and use of 
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technology.14 In this respect, the Confucian perspective agrees with Darian Meacham and 
Matthew Studley’s (2017) rejection of the need of robotic ‘mental’ states for robots to 
perform caring acts and supports their claim that robotic expressions of care, in terms of the 
robot’s gestures, movements, and articulations, are sufficient for a caring relation. They 
argue that the salient feature of a care environment is the caregivers’ expressive behavior 
but not their mental states, and further point out that in the care environment where 
caregivers are under stress, they can only maintain the care environment and caring relation 
through deceptive expressions of care.  
If the robotic expressions do reflect appropriate styles of interaction of caregivers should 
have towards the recipients of cares and the recipients do viewed them as care, the 
Confucian ethics of technology should also see the idea of ‘robotic care’ as ethically 
acceptable. It is important to point out that the robotic expressions must fit the existing 
styles of interaction, social conventions, and manners in a community for them to be viewed 
by the recipients (and the caregivers) as care. Hence, the design and assessment of robotic 
expressions should be based on the rituals of care in the community. 
In other words, a Confucian approach proceeds with the existing styles of interaction, 
social conventions, and manners, and viewed them as a normative basis to evaluate the 
changes in behaviors and interactions as a result of the use of technology and technological 
mediation. For example, the Confucian approach may find social media platforms to be 
ethically problematic because conventional norms of communication are easily breakable 
due to their design features, and thus renders the expression and comprehension of 
meaning and values in a community unstable and ineffective (Wong 2013). Alternatively, the 
Confucian approach also grants that the existing styles of interaction, social conventions, 
and manners can be employed to improve technology design and use by offering a common 
medium of meaning and values for designers, users, and recipients, as in the case of robotic 
care described by Meacham and Studley. Accordingly, referring to its communicative 
function, Confucian Li can assume two different but related roles in the ethical analysis of 
technology, namely it can act both as a normative standard for ethical analysis and also as a 
normative resource for devising technology design and use.  
The formative function of Confucian Li aims at refining and modulating our emotional 
and physiological experience, and thereby honing individuals’ pre-reflective responses and 
behaviors to everyday ethical encounters. Moreover, the refinement and modulation of 
experience are to be achieved through bodily practice and performance. Here, Confucian 
ethics calls for a return to the role of the body in ethical development, and thus connects it 
to the recent research on embodied cognition (Seok 2012; Ott 2017). In a similar vein, 
ethical analysis of technology should be more receptive to the bodily influences of 
technology, particularly the possibility of structuring bodily movements through technology 
design and use (see, e.g. Tuuri et al. 2017; Parviainen & Pirhonen 2017) and the affective 
 
14 A similar point has also been made by Pols (2017) in her commentary on Kamphof’s analysis 
without referring to styles of interaction, social conventions, or manners but including practices such 
as “’being watched’ and hence ‘looked after’”, “say good-night”, etc. 
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influences from different technologies (see, e.g. Slaby 2016). A Confucian approach, 
therefore, should attend to the bodily and affective impacts of technologies with reference 
to Li in a community and its tradition. It may even warrant pro-actively shaping individuals’ 
bodily and emotional states in accordance with Confucian Li through the use of technology 
and in technologically-mediated interactions (see, e.g. Slingerland 2011; Sarkissian 2017).  
Interestingly, Kristina Niedderer (2007, 2014) has advanced the idea of “Mindful Design” 
and illustrated the possibility to raise users’ attentiveness of the relational, social, 
environmental consequences of their actions through the design of objects. For example, 
she contemplates a design of mobile phone that “shout back” at its users should they be 
talking too loudly in public places, thereby alerting the users the disrupting impacts they 
have on others around them and leading them to adjust the level of their voice (2014). 
Niedderer’s “Mindful Design” approach converges with Confucian ethics’ concerns over 
people’s inappropriate emotional responses and behaviors as a result of their 
inattentiveness to appropriate styles of interaction, social conventions, and manners of the 
situations, or in the case of Confucian ethics inattentiveness to Li. In line with Niedderer’s 
“Mindful Design”, we can imagine the Confucian ethics of technology to advocate designing 
technology that enables individuals to be more attentive to the appropriateness of their 
performance of actions with reference to specific situations. For Confucians, therefore, 
technology can be ‘ritualized’ to support people’s ethical development. 
Finally, the aesthetic dimension of Confucian Li should also draw attention to the ideal 
of ‘beauty’ in the ethical analysis of technology. The ethical and the aesthetical are 
intertwined in Confucian ethics, that is—positive aesthetic features are considered to be 
ethically desirable. Aesthetically pleasing technological design and use are ethically 
significant because they can reduce potential friction for individuals and in their 
relationships. Accordingly, Confucian ethics adds an additional layer to the ethical analysis of 
technology, namely the aesthetic features in technology design and use. These aesthetic 
features, of course, are important to the extent that they make technology more pleasant 
and agreeable in relations and for the community (see, e.g. Pols 2017). 
Conclusion 
This chapter aims to explore the contribution of Confucian ethics to the ethical reflection of 
technology. In this chapter, I suggest that Confucian Li, with its emphasis on community, 
performance, and the aesthetic, provide an alternative approach to ethics of technology. 
Particularly, I argue that as an embodiment of communal and traditional values, Confucian Li 
can be used as a normative standard for ethical analysis of technology, or it can be used in 
informing the design of—or, better, the ritualization of—technological use and design. 
Before ending this chapter, I shall briefly outline some theoretical and ethical challenges to 
my Confucian approach to ethics of technology, as they are useful to indicate future 
research for this approach. 
For instance, the communicative function of Confucian Li could face two objections, i.e. 
the normative basis of Li and the possibility of changes in Li. So far, I have bracketed the 
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debate on the normative basis of Li, and assumed that it is, and should be, the medium of 
meaning and values for a community and in a tradition. However, one—especially those 
who are non-Confucians—can reasonably question whether and why Confucian Li should be 
the normative ground for communicating meaning and values. Moreover, if Confucian Li 
indeed assumes the normative ground, whether and when it can be altered. The possibility 
of changes is particularly important for ethics of technology, as technology is often 
‘disruptive’; and, the Confucian approach will be inherently dismissive and conservative if 
changes are difficult. Accordingly, a complete account of the Confucian approach requires an 
account of Confucian Li’s normativity and the mechanisms for changes in Li. 
In relation to the formative function of Confucian Li, a potential concern is about the 
boundary between ethically permissible and impermissible refinement and modulation of 
emotional and physiological experience. Here, the Confucian approach must articulate a 
clearer account of why refinement and modulation of experience are essential to ethical 
lives of individuals (see, e.g. Sarkissian 2017). 
There is much work to be done to fully articulate a Confucian approach to ethics of 
technology based on Li. This chapter, therefore, should be viewed as a modest attempt to 
introduce the idea of Confucian Li to the ethical analysis of technology and describe how it 
can offer an alternative perspective to ethics of technology. 
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